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I. Introduction
The United States Senate often adds various types of conditions, also known as
reservations, understandings, and declarations (“RUDs”), to its advice and consent
to multilateral treaties. The ability to add conditions to a treaty likely increases the
number of States willing to join a treaty and abide by the international norms set
forth therein because it allows States to modify their treaty obligations in ways that
do not conflict with the basic object and purpose of the treaty to address domestic
concerns.1 However, the use of conditions also has the potential to undermine the
integrity of the treaty by allowing States to opt out of important legal obligations.2
Depending on the type of condition, they can also create legal uncertainty regarding
treaty obligations and relationships.  This paper examines treaty practice with
respect to use of conditions to determine how and when conditions are being used,
with a particular focus on U.S. treaty practice and the effect of those conditions on
the United States’ legal obligations.
Drawing on a database of almost 400 multilateral treaties to which the United
States is a party, this article demonstrates the U.S. Senate’s use of such conditions
has grown significantly over the last few decades, particularly with respect to the
use of conditions other than reservations.3 The Senate purports to use conditions to
modify the United States’ legal obligations; to clarify ambiguous treaty terms, and
to address how a treaty is to be implemented in U.S. law.  However, the legal effect
of the Senate’s use of conditions, both in U.S. law and international law, is often
murky.  Accordingly, this article examines Senate practice with respect to its advice
and consent function for multilateral treaties to determine what is happening in this
area of the law and whether changes should be made.
The article begins by explaining the domestic and international legal authority
for the use of conditions in U.S. treaty practice.  The article then describes different
1. See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Advisory Opin-ion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 29) (allowing states to condition their consent to treaties may also lowernegotiation costs because states do not have to agree to every word of a treaty before finalizing thetext).2. See id.3. The scope of this article and the data on which it relies are limited to multilateral internationalagreements adopted by the United States between 1960 and 2009 through the Senate advice andconsent process of Article II of the U.S. Constitution.  Although the U.S. Senate sometimes addsconditions to bilateral agreements, such conditions raise different legal issues because they usuallymust be accepted by the other party before a valid agreement is formed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1987). See also Michael J. Glennon, The
Constitutional Power of the United States Senate to Condition Its Consent to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 533, 542 (1991).  As explained below, in most cases under international law, treaty partiesmay unilaterally add conditions to multilateral treaties without obtaining all the other parties’ con-sent.
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types of conditions the Senate has attached to multilateral international agreements
to which the United States is a party, and how and when the Senate adds conditions
to such agreements.  Utilizing a database containing 380 multilateral treaties to
which the United States is a party, the article shows changes in Senate practice over
time.  The article identifies the types of conditions most frequently added by the
Senate, and examines whether the Senate is more likely to add conditions to treaties
depending on the treaty’s subject matter.  Based on this behavior, the article
proposes some theories as to why the U.S. Senate is more likely to add conditions to
certain types of treaties than others.  The article also considers whether a
prohibition on treaty reservations significantly lessens the likelihood the United
States will join a particular treaty.
Next, the article analyzes the extent to which U.S. practice is consistent or
inconsistent with international law and practice, including the extent to which other
States use certain types of conditions when joining multilateral treaties. This
examination shows that U.S. treaty practice is not entirely consistent with
international practice, especially with respect to the use of “understandings.”  It also
highlights legal problems that may arise through the use of some types of conditions.
The article then examines the impact on and response of the other branches of
the federal government to the Senate’s actions.  Specifically, the article discusses the
extent to which the executive and judicial branches of U.S. government are or should
be bound by the different types of conditions proposed by the Senate.  Finally, the
article concludes with some recommendations regarding changes in treaty practice
for the future.
II. Background
A. U.S. Senate Advice and Consent Power
Under Article II, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the President makes treaties,
while the Senate gives its advice and consent to a treaty’s ratification.4 In U.S.
practice, presidents initiate the treaty process by negotiating and signing
multilateral agreements.5 As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, the President
“makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates.”6
Once the treaty negotiations are concluded and the President signs the treaty, the
4. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.5. FRANK ET AL., U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND SIMULATIONS 284 (4th ed.2012).6. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
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executive branch then submits the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.7
Pursuant to Senate Rules XXX and XXV, after an initial reading, the Presiding
Officer refers the treaty to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.8 The treaty
remains on the Committee’s calendar from Congress to Congress until the
Committee reports it to the full Senate or recommends its return to the President or
until the Committee is discharged of the treaty by the Senate.9 The Committee
Chairman decides whether and when to schedule one or more public hearings on the
treaty.10 The Committee Chairman also decides on the timing of mark-ups.
If the Committee favorably reports the treaty to the full Senate, the Senate first
considers the text of the treaty itself. 11 It also considers whether to add conditions
or various types of RUDs to its advice and consent to U.S. ratification of a particular
treaty.12 Sometimes, the President will recommend to the Senate that certain
conditions be added to a treaty, as in the cases of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)13 and the Convention Against Torture (CAT).14 More
often, it is the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that proposes conditions.
There are two methods by which the Senate may condition its consent to a
treaty.15 First, the Senate may include one or more conditions in its resolution of
ratification.16 Second, it may insert in the resolution of ratification a condition that
the text of the treaty be amended, which operates as a directive to the President to
go back to the treaty negotiating table.17 When the resolution of ratification is
presented to the full Senate, it will incorporate the Senate Foreign Relation
Committee’s proposed amendments or conditions.18 Additional conditions may be
7. FRANK ET AL., supra note 6, at 286-87.8. Standing Rules of the U.S. Senate, available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_in-dex_subjects/Rules_and_Procedure_vrd.htm; see also, COMM.ONFOREIGNRELATIONS, 106THCONG.,CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THEROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGNRELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE 120 (Comm. Print 2001), available athttp://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CPRT-106SPRT66922/CPRT-106SPRT66922/content-detail.html[hereinafter CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE].9. Id. at 122.10. Id.11. VALERIEHEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCHSERV., CRS98-384, SENATECONSIDERATION OFTREATIES1(2014), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-pub-lish.cfm?pid=%26*2%3C4P%3C%3B%3F%0A.12. FRANK ET AL., supra note 6, at 287-88.13. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and
“Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 515, 523 (1991).14. SeeConvention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,S. Exec. Rpt. No. 101-30, at 2, 7-8 (1990).15. Glennon, supra note 4, at 542.16. Id.17. Id.18. SeeHEITSHUSEN, supra note 12, at 2.
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proposed during the full Senate’s consideration of the resolution of ratification.19 The
inclusion of a condition in the resolution of ratification requires only a majority
vote,20 while the final vote on the resolution of ratification requires a two-thirds
majority.21
While the U.S. Constitution is silent as to the Senate’s authority to condition its
consent to treaties, it is well settled that the Senate has the power to do so.22
However, as discussed in more detail below, the Senate’s power to condition its
consent is not unlimited, as it must be exercised consistently with the system of
shared power over foreign relations under the U.S. Constitution.23 The attachment
of various conditions is also governed by international law.24
If two-thirds of the Senators give their consent to the treaty, the Senate returns
the treaty to the President, who decides whether to proceed with the ratification
process.  If the Senate has added conditions to the treaty, the President has several
options as to how to respond to those conditions.  If the President deems the
conditions acceptable, he may proceed with treaty ratification, usually by signing an
instrument of ratification including the conditions and depositing that instrument
of ratification with the appropriate body.25 If the President deems one or more of the
conditions unacceptable, he may refuse to ratify the treaty.  He may also wait and
resubmit the original treaty to the Senate at a later date for reconsideration, perhaps
after an election has changed the political makeup of the Senate.26 He may also
decide to renegotiate parts of the treaty with the other treaty partners before
resubmitting it to the Senate.27 If the Senate has added a reservation that changes
the United States’ legal obligations under the treaty, the President is expected to
19. Id.20. Id.21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.22. Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32 (1869) (“The Senate are not required to adopt or reject [a treaty] as awhole, but may modify or amend it.”); Power Authority of the State of New York v. Federal PowerComm’n, 247 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (“Unquestionably the Senate may condition its consent to atreaty upon a variation of its terms.”); Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 266 (5th Cir. 2001) (U.S.Senate’s reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is valid); see alsoGlennon, supra note 4, at 534.23. See Damrosch, supra note 14, at 527.24. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 19 and 20, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.331.  Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties(VCLT), it considers many of the provisions of the VCLT to constitute customary international lawon the law of treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2016) [hereinafter VCLT]; see
also Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs at the Department of State and Secretary of StateRoger’s Report to the President, Oct. 18, 1971, 65 DEP’T ST. BULL. 684, 685 (1971); Chubb & Son,Inc. v. Asiana Airlines, 214 F.3d 301, 308 (2nd Cir. 2000).25. FRANK ET AL., supra note 6, at 289.26. Id.27. Id.
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notify the other treaty parties to allow them an opportunity to respond.28 If the
President objects to any of the conditions added by the Senate, this is the best time
to do so.29 Otherwise, the President is likely to have difficulty in rejecting those
conditions at a later date.30
B. Types/Definitions of Conditions
1. Reservations
Reservations are perhaps the easiest type of condition to understand because they
have the most accepted definition and legal effect.  The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT) defines a ’reservation’ as “a unilateral statement, however
phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of a treaty in their application to that State.”31 It is important to
note in this regard that it does not matter what a State calls the condition it attaches
to a treaty.  If the condition attached to the treaty purports to exclude, limit, or
modify a state’s legal obligations, it will be treated as a reservation.32
Under the VCLT, the default rule is that reservations are permitted so long as
they are not prohibited by the treaty and they are not incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty.33 When a State makes a reservation to a treaty, the other
States who are parties to the treaty may respond in a number of ways.  As a general
rule, the non-reserving State may accept or object to the reservation.34 If the non-
reserving State accepts the reservation, the reserving State and the accepting State
enter into a treaty relationship absent the provision of the treaty that was subject to
the reservation.  If the non-reserving State objects to the reservation, it may choose
whether to remain in a treaty relationship with the reserving State or whether the
reservation is so objectionable that it does not wish for the treaty to enter into force
28. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 313 cmt. c-e (AM. LAW INST. 1987).29. Glennon, supra note 4, at 553.30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 314 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Since the Pres-ident can make a treaty only with the advice and consent of the Senate, he must give effect to condi-tions imposed by the Senate on its consent.”). See also Part V.5 below.31. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 2.1(d). Although the United States is not a party to the VCLT, the Restate-ment (Third) on Foreign Relations Law appears to largely accept this definition. See RESTATEMENT(THIRD)ONFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 313 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987).32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 313 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987). See, e.g., Anglo-French Continental Shelf Case, 54 I.L.R. 6, 40 (1977) (Permanent Court of Arbitration determines aso-called “interpretative declaration” made by France to a treaty is actually a reservation because itpurports to modify the legal effect of the treaty).33. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 19.34. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 20.
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at all between the reserving and objecting State.35 If the non-reserving State
remains silent, i.e., neither expressly accepts nor objects to a reservation within one
year of notification of the reservation, the State will be deemed to have consented to
the reservation.36
For example, when the United States joined the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,37 it made two reservations: one stating
that the United States must give its explicit consent on a case-by-case basis before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) may take jurisdiction over any disputes
relating to the United States’ obligations under the Genocide Convention and the
other stating that the U.S. Constitution will take priority over the Convention in any
case of conflict.38 Several other States objected to one or both of these reservations,
including Mexico and the Netherlands.  Both stated that, in their view, the United
States’ reservation regarding ICJ jurisdiction is contrary to the object and purpose
of the Convention.  Mexico also claimed the United States could not invoke domestic
law as a reason for not complying with the treaty.39 However, only the Netherlands
does not consider the United States a party to the treaty as a result of the
incompatible reservation.40 By contrast, Mexico does consider the United States to
35. Id.36. Id.37. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S.277.
38. Id. The exact language of the United States’ reservations is as follows: "(1) That with referenceto article IX of the Convention, before any dispute to which the United States is a party may be
submitted to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under this article, the spe-cific consent of the United States is required in each case. (2) That nothing in the Conventionrequires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited bythe Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States." Chapter IV HumanRights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.
39. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78U.N.T.S. 277. Mexico’s response to the U.S. reservation is as follows: “The Government of Mex-ico believes that the reservation made by the United States Government to article IX of theaforesaid Convention should be considered invalid because it is not in keeping with the objectand purpose of the Convention, nor with the principle governing the interpretation of treatieswhereby no State can invoke provisions of its domestic law as a reason for not complying witha treaty.  If the aforementioned reservation were applied, it would give rise to a situation of un-
certainty as to the scope of the obligations which the United States Government would assumewith respect to the Convention. Mexico's objection to the reservation in question should not beinterpreted as preventing the entry into force of the 1948 Convention between the [Mexican]Government and the United States Government.” Chapter IV Human Rights, U.N. TREATYCOLLECTION, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.40. The Netherlands’ objection to the U.S. reservations states: “With regard to the reservations
made by the United States of America:  As concerns the first reservation, the Government ofthe Kingdom of the Netherlands recalls its declaration, made on 20 June 1966 on the occasionof the accession of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Convention [...] stating that in its
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be a party to the Convention, even though Mexico objected to these conditions.  This
example illustrates the different options available to States when responding to
treaty conditions.
As shown above, reservations have an accepted legal meaning in both
international and U.S. law.  When the U.S. Senate gives its advice and consent to
ratification of a treaty subject to a reservation, it knows that it is changing the legal
obligations of the United States under the treaty and that the United States’ treaty
partners will be notified and given an opportunity to accept or reject the reservation.
Although a complex web of treaty relationships may develop as a result, these
relationships are at least transparent, which is not always the case with other types
of conditions as demonstrated below. Because reservations have a clearer legal
definition and have been studied more extensively in international law and are thus
more understood,41 this article will focus more on other types of conditions, such as
understandings and declarations.
2. Understandings
Unlike reservations, the VCLT does not provide a definition of an
“understanding” of a treaty provision, nor does the United Nations Treaty Collection
include “understanding” in its definition of treaty terms.  Likewise, the International
Law Commission’s 2011 Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties does not
include the term.42 Hence, the use of the term “understanding” has a less settled
meaning in international law.
In U.S. Senate practice, the term “understanding” has been used to denote
“interpretive statements that clarify or elaborate, rather than change, the provisions
of an agreement and that are deemed to be consistent with the obligations imposed
opinion the reservations in respect of article IX of the Convention, made at that time by a num-ber of states, were incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, and that theGovernment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands did not consider states making such reserva-tions parties to the Convention. Accordingly, the Government of the Kingdom of the Nether-lands does not consider the United States of America a party to the Convention.” Chapter IV
Human Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.41. See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, YALE J. INT’L L. 307 (2006); David Auerswald & ForrestMaltzman, Policymaking through Advice and Consent: Treaty Consideration by the United States
Senate, 65 J.POLITICS 1097 (2003); John King Gamble,Reservations to Multilateral Treaties: A Mac-
roscopic View of State Practice, 74 AM. J. INT’L. L. 372, 379 (1980).42. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Third Session: Guide to Practice on Reservations toTreaties, U.N. Doc. A/66/10/Add. 1, para. 75 (2011), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/re-ports/2011/english/addendum.pdf [hereinafter Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties].
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by the agreement.”43 For example, when the United States ratified the Inter-
American Convention Against Terrorism, the United States included an
“understanding” stating: “The United States of America understands that the term
‘international humanitarian law’ in paragraph 2 of article 15 of the Convention has
the same substantive meaning as the law of war.”44
The Congressional Research Service (“CRS”), which offered the above-quoted
definition of an “understanding,” admits, “The actual effect of a particular proposed
understanding may, of course, be debatable.”45 For example, when Congress passed
a joint resolution in 1947 approving the Headquarters Agreement between the
United Nations and the United States, it included a statement that “[n]othing in
this agreement shall be construed as in any way diminishing, abridging or
weakening the right of the United States to safeguard its security and completely to
control the entrance of aliens into any territory of the United States other than the
headquarters district and its immediate vicinity.”46 The text of this joint resolution
was communicated to the United Nations. Upon receipt, neither the U.N. Secretary
General nor the General Assembly commented upon it.47 In 1953, the United States
invoked the joint resolution to justify its denial of visas to representatives of two
nongovernmental organizations whom the United States considered a security
threat.48 The United Nations claimed it was not bound by the joint resolution, but
the United States took the position that its consent to the Headquarters Agreement
was subject to it.49 The disagreement was never conclusively resolved.50 In fact, the
issue has come up again several times since then, including most recently in April
2014 when the United States denied a visa to the Iranian Ambassador to the United
43. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 125; see also FRANK ET AL., supra note 6, at288.44. Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02), June 3, 2002, 42 I.L.M.19 (2003), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-66.html#United States of America.45. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCHSERVICE, supra note 9, at 125.  Likewise, the U.N. Final Clauses of Mul-tilateral Treaties Handbook states, “The determination of whether a statement is a declaration oran unauthorized reservation may become complex.” U.N.OFFICE OFLEGALAFFAIRS, FINALCLAUSES
OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES HANDBOOK, U.N. Sales No. E.04.V.3 (2003), available at https://trea-ties.un.org/doc/source/publications/FC/English.pdf [hereinafter FINAL CLAUSES OF MULTILATERALTREATIESHANDBOOK]46. Agreement Between the United Nations and the United States Regarding the Headquarters of theUnited Nations, 61 Stat. 756, 767-78 (1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1676, available at http://ava-lon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad036.asp#b2.47. LOUISHENKIN, FOREIGNAFFAIRS AND THECONSTITUTION 382, n. 32. (1972).48. Id. at 382-83. n. 32. See alsoW. Michael Reisman, The Arafat Visa Affair: Exceeding the Bounds of
Host-State Discretion, 83 AM. J. INT’LL. 519, 523-24 (1989).49. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 383 n. 32.50. Id.
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Nations because he had participated in the Iranian Hostage Crisis in 1979.51 This
example illustrates conditions that are not labelled “reservations” may affect the
United States’ legal obligations. However, the exact legal effect of such conditions
has not been finally resolved.
3. Declarations
In international practice, the term “declaration” can have multiple meanings.52
Declarations may be stand-alone instruments, such as the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),53 or they may be attached to a treaty, such
as a declaration under article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) accepting the competence of the Human Rights Committee to hear
inter-State complaints.54 Declarations may or may not be legally binding, depending
on their usage.55 In fact, States sometimes use the term “declaration” specifically to
avoid creating a legally binding obligation.56 An example of a legally binding
declaration is the Joint Declaration between the United Kingdom and China on the
Question of Hong Kong of 1984.57 An example of a declaration that was not meant
to be legally binding is the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
largely considered to be “soft law.”58 Whether a declaration is intended to be legally
binding often depends on the language of the declaration itself and the expressions
of intent of the parties.59
Some declarations that start out as non-legally binding may come to reflect
51. SeeMark Hosenball,U.S. may test influence at U.N. by denying visa to Iran envoy, REUTERS (Apr. 9,2014), http://news.yahoo.com/u-may-test-influence-u-n-denying-visa-230729169.html; Scott Neu-man, U.S. Denies Visa to Iran’s Controversial U.N. Envoy, NPR (Apr. 11, 2014, 1:45 PM),http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/04/11/301793898/congress-votes-to-bar-entry-to-irans-u-n-ambassador. Lacking agreement on the legal effect of the condition, the parties usually reach apolitical compromise instead.52. Definition of Key Terms Used in UN Treaty Collection, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#exchange (last visitedFeb. 20, 2016).53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), available
at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].54. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 41, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, avail-
able at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [hereinafter ICCPR].55. Definition of Key Terms Used in UN Treaty Collection, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#exchange (last visitedFeb. 20, 2016).56. Id.57. Id.58. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992); see also Magnus JeskoLanger, Principle 21: The Role of Youth, in THE RIO DECLARATION ON ENVIRONMENT ANDDEVELOPMENT: A COMMENTARY 519 (ed. Jorge E. Viñuales, 2014).59. Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, supra note 43, § 1.3.
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customary international law.  For example, the 1948 UDHR began as a non-binding
United Nations General Assembly resolution, but later came to be viewed as an
authoritative statement of basic human rights and, thus, evolved into binding
customary international law.60
Under international law, “[a]n interpretive declaration is an instrument that is
annexed to a treaty with the goal of interpreting or explaining the provisions of the
latter.”61 The United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) has also
recognized a “conditional interpretive declaration” which it defines as “a unilateral
declaration formulated by a State when [joining a treaty], whereby the State . . .
subjects its consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty
or certain provisions thereof.”62 Because a “declaration,” like an “understanding,”
may also interpret a treaty, there is overlap between the meaning of a “declaration”
and an “understanding.”63
According to the ILC, an interpretive declaration is not supposed to modify treaty
obligations.64 It may only clarify the meaning which its author attributes to a treaty
provision.65 However, as discussed in more detail below, it may constitute an
element to be taken into account in treaty interpretation in accordance with the
general rules for treaty interpretation under international law.66
With respect to U.S. practice, the CRS states that the U.S. Senate may use
declarations as “statements of purpose, policy, or position related to matters raised
in a treaty in question but not altering or limiting any of its provisions.”67 Because
this type of declaration is not intended to modify the legal effect of the treaty, the
President does not always include them in the instrument of ratification provided to
the other treaty parties.68 The Senate has taken the position that all conditions
60. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 54; see also THOMAS BUERGENTHAL ET AL.,INTERNATIONALHUMANRIGHTS IN ANUTSHELL 41-42 (4 ed. 2009).  Customary international law isdefined as the general practice of states accepted as law. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1179.61. Definition of Key Terms Used in UN Treaty Collection, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#exchange (last visitedFeb. 20, 2016).  The International Law Commission offers a similar definition: “‘Interpretive decla-ration’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an interna-tional organization, whereby that State or that organization, purports to specify or clarify the mean-ing or scope of a treaty or of certain of its provisions.” Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties,
supra note 43, § 1.2. The ILC takes the position, “A State . . . is free to formulate an interpretivedeclaration unless the interpretive declaration is prohibited by the treaty.” Id. § 3.5.62. Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, supra note 43, § 1.4.63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 313, cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1987).64. Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, supra note 43, § 4.7.1.65. Id.66. Id.67. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 126.
68. See id. at 124-27. One example of a decision not to include a condition in the resolution of ratifycation comes from the ratification of the Convention Against Torture (CAT). U.S. Senator Helms
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should be notified to other treaty parties unless the Senate instructs the President
otherwise. The Senate favors notification because it clarifies the rights and
obligations undertaken by the United States in ratifying a treaty.69 The general rule
in favor of notification is laudable because it increases transparency. However, in
those exceptional cases where the Senate instructs the President not to give notice
of some conditions, it may put the President in a difficult position because the
executive branch must evaluate the Senate’s action to determine whether in fact the
Senate’s additional language does or does not modify the legal effect of the treaty.70
If the President believed that a “declaration” has the legal effect of a reservation, he
should include that “declaration” in his instrument of ratification so that other
treaty parties are put on notice and given the opportunity to object. But if the
President simply follows the Senate’s advice and does not notify other treaty parties,
a treaty party or an international tribunal may later determine that the
“declaration” really functions as a reservation, thus altering the United States’ legal
obligations under the relevant treaty and potentially putting the United States in
breach.
The CRS also notes that the term “declaration” is sometimes used
interchangeably with the term “proviso.”71 Provisos often include conditions relating
to the process for domestic implementation of the treaty.72 Provisos have also been
defined as relating “to issues of U.S. law or procedure [that] are not intended to be
included in the instruments of ratification to be deposited or exchanged with other
countries.”73 Thus, provisos overlap with both “understandings” and “declarations”
because they address issues relating to the domestic implementation of a treaty.74
Perhaps because provisos are intended to operate domestically, they are not
mentioned in international law sources, such as the VCLT or the U.N. Treaty
Database.
“wanted to attach a sovereignty proviso to the torture treaty as had been done in the case of the
genocide pact. But he agreed with [Senator] Pell that the reservation would be attached to theresolution of ratification, not to the instrument of ratification itself — the legal document noti-fying the United Nations of U.S. assent to the treaty. Although several senators, including Dan-iel Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., argued the proviso was unnecessary and harmful in the eyes ofother countries, the Senate adopted Helms' amendment along with three other reservations asan en bloc amendment by division vote.” CQ Almanac, Senate Oks Ratification of Torture Treaty,
QC PRESS (1990), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/document.php?id=cqal90-1118781.69. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 127.70. The ILC Guide to Reservations in Treaty Practice states that interpretive declarations should be inwriting and communicated to the other treaty parties in the same way that reservations are. Guideto Practice on Reservations to Treaties, supra note 43, §§ 2.1.5, 2.4.5.71. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 126.72. Id.73. FRANK ET AL., supra note 6, at 288.74. See discussion of “federalism understandings” and “non-self-executing declarations” infra p. 381-382.
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There are a few other types of conditions the Senate has used over time, such as
“exceptions,” “exclusions,” and “explanations.” 75 However, like provisos, their use is
so infrequent, they have not been included in this study.
III. U.S. Senate Treaty Ratification Practice over the Last Fifty
Years
A.The Use of Conditions in Multilateral Treaties to Which the Senate
Gave Its Advice and Consent
To understand the potential scope of the use of conditions in U.S. treaty practice,
the author compiled a database of multilateral treaties to which the United States
has become a party between 1960 and 2009.76 The list of multinational treaties the
United States joined during this time period was initially drawn from the U.S. State
Department’s Treaties in Force database.77 Through the constitutional advice and
consent process described above, the United States joined a total of 380 multilateral
treaties between 1960 and 2009.78
The author initially classified the treaties as to subject matter using the U.S.
State Department’s nomenclature (which contained 96 categories), e.g., atomic
energy, postal arrangements, trade and commerce, etc. The author then grouped
related treaties into 30 subject matter categories. For example, all treaties dealing
with human rights were combined in one human rights category that includes the
75. Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L &COMP. L.J. 89, 108-09 (1996).76. This time period was chosen because it represents five decades of U.S. treaty practice during thepost-World War II period following the creation of the United Nations - a time period during whichthere has been tremendous growth in the number of states in the international community and inmultilateral international agreements. See Gamble, supra note 42, at 377.77. Treaties in Force, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/index.htm (last visitedFeb. 21, 2016).
78. Id. Despite extensive research efforts, including utilization of staff at the SIU School of Law,the Law Library of Congress, and the U.S. State Department, the author was unable to locatethe text of the following eight multilateral treaties, which are therefore excluded from the da-tabase: Agreement Regarding the Establishment, Construction and Operation of a Uranium
Enrichment Installation in the United States, with Annex and Agreed Minute (02/01/1995);Agreement on the Establishment of the ITER International Fusion Energy Organization for theJoint Implementation of the ITER Project (10/24/2007); Implementing Agreement for a Programof Research and Development on Energy Conservation in Heat Transfer and Heat Exchangers(06/28/1977); Implementing Agreement for Cooperation in the Development of Large Scale WindEnergy Conversion Systems (10/06/1977); Implementing Agreement for a Program of Research,Development and Demonstration on Enhanced Recovery of Oil (05/22/1979); Agreement Regard-
ing the Status of Foreign Forces in the Former Territory of the German Democratic Republic(10/03/1990); Agreement On Technological Safeguards Associated With The Launch Of TheINMARSAT–3 Satellite (08/19/1994); Relating To Mobile Services (10/3/1989).
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State Department categories of Child Rights, Genocide, Human Rights, Labor,
Migration, Racial Discrimination, Refugees, Slavery, Torture and Women-Political
Rights.79
The author added information regarding whether the treaty allows or prohibits
reservations, whether the United States has added any conditions to its
participation in the treaty and, if so, what type of condition.  Initially, the conditions
were classified into five common categories as proposed by Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith:80
a. Substantive reservations pursuant to which the United States declines to be
bound by one or more provisions of the treaty (other than dispute settlement
provisions)
b. Interpretive conditions which set forth the U.S. interpretation of a vague treaty
term
c. Non-self-executing declarations, which provide that the treaty will not be
effective in U.S. law until Congress passes implementing legislation
d. Federalism understandings which provide that the federal government will
implement the treaty provisions where it has jurisdiction to do so and otherwise
implementation will be done by state and local governments
e. Reservations to the use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international dispute settlement bodies to resolve disputes arising under the treaty
However, a few conditions did not fall in these categories and are included in a
catch-all “other” category.
1. How often does the United States add conditions to multilateral
treaties?
Scholars in law and political science have done work in the past examining the
use of reservations in treaty practice, but little work has been done on other types of
conditions.  For example, in 1980, Professor John Gamble examined the use of
reservations (not understandings and declarations) in international practice.  He
asserted there are no reservations at all to 85% of multilateral treaties.81 He also
examined the types of reservations added by States to multilateral treaties and
concluded that reservations “are not too serious a problem; most are of a fairly minor
nature.”82 Another study by Auerswald and Maltzman published in 2003 containing
79. The treaty subject groupings can be found in Annex A. infra pp. 412-414.80. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U.PA. L. REV. 399, 416-23 (2000).81. Gamble, supra note 42, at 379.82. Id. at 391.
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data on 796 bilateral and multilateral U.S. treaties from 1947 to 2000 concluded the
U.S. Senate added reservations to treaties 20% of the time (once again the data did
not consider understandings and declarations).83
Professor Kevin Kennedy conducted the most comprehensive examination of
Senate practice with respect to reservations, understandings and declarations from
1795-1990, and concluded the Senate added conditions to 15% of bilateral and
multilateral treaties.84 He also concluded “the incidence of conditional approvals
has been relatively constant over time and that the Senate has not singled out any
category of treaties for conditional approval.”85 This article builds on and refines
this previous work by focusing exclusively on U.S. multilateral treaties and adding
an examination of multilateral treaty practice from 1990-2009, a period when
changes in these patterns appear.
Professor Kennedy’s U.S. treaty database shows a relatively steady trend in the
use of conditions over time.86 However, Professor Kennedy’s data does not include
the post-Cold War period, and especially in the period following the terrorist attacks
of 9/11/2001.  Auerswald and Maltzman’s data extending through the year 2000
show the use of treaty reservations became more common after the breakdown of
the Cold War consensus.87 However, Auerswald and Maltzman only had one decade
of post-Cold War data and were only focused on reservations.
The data collected for this study demonstrates that the United States’ additions
of conditions to multilateral treaties has increased over time, with a particularly
sharp increase in the last decade. As demonstrated by Graph A, in the 1960s and
1970s, the United States only added conditions to its multilateral treaties 11-12% of
the time.88 That percentage rose to 21-26% during the 1980s and 1990s.  More
recently, the United States has added conditions to its treaties at an even higher
rate.  By the 2000s, the United States added conditions to the multilateral treaties
it ratified 34% of the time.89
83. David Auerswald & Forrest Maltzman, Policymaking through Advice and Consent: Treaty Consid-
eration by the United States Senate, 65 J. POLITICS 1097, 1102 (2003).84. Kennedy, supra note 76, at 91.85. Id. at 92.86. Professor Kennedy broke down treaties from 1795-1990 into fifty-year time periods and found thatthe United States added conditions from 9%-18.8% of the time. Kennedy, supra note 76, at 97.87. Auerswald & Maltzman, supra note 83, at 1105.88. Unlike Professor Gamble’s data set which focused solely on reservations, the data set used for thisgraph includes reservations, understandings and declarations, so comparisons with respect to usageare not exact.  When reservations are broken out, there is no consistent pattern with respect to theiruse as is shown in Graph B infra p. 380.89. The overall rate for the United States’ use of conditions is 29% from the 1960s through the 2000s.
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Graph A: U.S. Treaties by Decade
The increasing use of conditions raises several questions, including why the
Senate has seen fit to attach more conditions to treaties,90 how that change in
practice has impacted issues of separation of powers between the branches of the
federal government and federalism issues between the federal government and the
states, whether that practice is consistent with international treaty practice, and,
ultimately, whether it is good policy.
2. What types of conditions are most often added?
In trying to understand Senate practice, it is useful to examine whether certain
types of conditions are more common than others. Table 1 below demonstrates that
declarations are the most common (43), with reservations being the second most
90. In previous work on this subject, the author suggested the changes in the numbers and types oftreaties the United States is joining may be attributable to the newer post-Cold War world order andthe rise of terrorism as global threat. See Cindy Buys, An Empirical Look at U.S. Treaty Practice:
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common (36) and understandings being the least common (30).  Out of 380
multilateral treaties in the database, 109 have at least one condition attached, for a










The 2003 UN Treaty Handbook states that, internationally, “[t]he contemporary
practice shows a proliferation of declarations in relation to treaties.”91 This
statement is consistent with U.S. practice, where declarations are added more
frequently than reservations or understandings.  The more frequent occurrence of
declarations may result, in part, from the multiple types of declarations that exist –
everything from stand-alone legally binding documents to statements that seek to
clarify the meaning of a particular treaty term.  It may also be the result of States
trying to fit international treaty obligations into their different legal systems and
cultures.
Graph B below answers the question of whether the use of a particular kind of
condition - reservations, understandings, or declarations - has increased over time.
This graph demonstrates that the use of all three types of conditions has increased
over time.  Reservations started off with relatively infrequent usage in the 1960s
and 1970s (5-9% of treaties had a reservation), climbing to 18-20% of treaties having
reservations in the 1980s and 1990s, and plateauing then remaining at 21% in the
2000s.
Likewise, the use of understandings also increased over time, leveling off a bit in
the last decade.  Understandings were added to only 5% of treaties in the 1960s;
their use increased to 23% in the 1980s; 29% in the 1990s; and then fell slightly to
27% in the 2000s.
The clearest upward trend exists with respect to the addition of declarations to
treaties.  The frequency in which the Senate attached declarations began in the
single digits in the 1960s and 1970s (8-9%), and continued to increase over time to
14% in the 1980s, 20% in the 1990s and 32% in the 2000s.
91. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 50.
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Graph B: Percentage of Treaty Conditions by Decade92
Table 2 below further breaks down the conditions attached by the U.S. Senate to
multilateral treaties by frequency of type.
Table 2
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As Table 2 shows, the most frequent type of condition (47) is an interpretive
understanding or declaration that purports to clarify, elaborate or explain a treaty
provision.  The Senate normally takes the position that this type of condition is
different from a reservation because it does not limit or modify the United States’
treaty obligations.  In fact, this type of condition can affect the United States’ treaty
obligations if other treaty partners interpret the vague treaty term differently.  An
example of differing interpretations of a treaty term is illustrated by the case of Sean
Goldman, a 4-year-old boy who was taken to Brazil by his mother, who refused to
return Sean to his father in the United States.94 The father pursued legal remedies
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
in both U.S. and Brazilian courts.95 Article 12 of the Hague Convention provides a
defense to the return of an abducted child if more than a year has passed between
the time of the wrongful removal and “the date of commencement of” judicial or
administrative proceedings for the child’s return.96 During the legal proceedings,
the United States and Brazil interpreted the commencement of the one-year period
differently.97 Thus, differing interpretations can lead to a lack of uniformity of treaty
obligations and to different legal rights and responsibilities in different states.
The second most common type of condition (41) is a substantive one, i.e., a
reservation that actually alters legal rights and obligations with respect to
particular portions of the treaty.  For example, when the United States ratified the
ICCPR, it entered a reservation preserving the right to impose capital punishment
on persons below the age of 18.98
The third most common condition, but significantly less so (10), is a federalism
understanding, which states that if the federal government has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the treaty, it will implement the treaty,  but if the treaty touches
94. Daniel B. Wood, Sean Goldman case highlights rising international child abduction, CHRISTIANSCI.MONITOR (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2009/1223/Sean-Goldman-case-highlights-rising-international-child-abduction.95. See id.96. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 1343U.N.T.S. 89.
97. Amanda M. Waide, To Comply or Not to Comply? Brazil’s Relationship with the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 271, 291(2010).98. The text of the United States’ reservations to the ICCPR may be found in the UN Treaty Database,https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. Of course, the juvenile death penalty is now considered unconstitutional asa result of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). Thus, theUnited States no longer relies on this reservation. Id.
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on areas of state regulation, states will implement those provisions.99While this type
of understanding does not change the meaning of any particular treaty provisions,
it does have the potential to affect the implementation of the United States’ legal
obligations and, thus, the effectiveness of the treaty.
For example, child pornography is defined somewhat differently under U.S.
federal law, state law, and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of
the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, to
which the United States is a party (despite not joining the underlying Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC)). Upon joining the Optional Protocol to the CRC,
the United States attached a federalism understanding to its instrument of
ratification asserting the federal government and state governments may each have
jurisdiction over different aspects of matters covered by the Optional Protocol.100 The
differences in legal jurisdiction and definitions may be a problem with respect to the
applicability of the Optional Protocol throughout the United States.  In this regard,
Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as anyone under the age of 18.101 Article 2 of the
Optional Protocol provides: “Child pornography means any representation, by
whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated explicit sexual activities or
any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily sexual purposes.”102
U.S. federal law defines child pornography as "any visual depiction, including any
photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or
picture . . . of sexually explicit conduct" involving a person under the age of 18.103
Thus, U.S. law requires depiction of sexually explicit conduct, while the OP only
requires depiction of sexual parts of a child.  Additionally, in federal court, the child
pornography or the apparatus used to create it must have crossed state lines for
99. Six of these ten treaties relate to international criminal law.  The use of a federalism understandingwith respect to this type of treaty is not surprising given the states’ traditional role in regulatingcrime.  The remaining treaties all deal with human rights issues – the International Covenant onCivil and Political Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of RacialDiscrimination, and the Convention for the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect ofIntercountry Adoption.100. The understanding reads as follows: “IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROTOCOL IN THEFEDERAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES. -The United States understands that the Protocolshall be implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises jurisdiction over thematters covered therein, and otherwise by the State and local governments. To the extent that Stateand local governments exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall as nec-essary, take appropriate measures to ensure the fulfillment of the Protocol.”  Optional Protocol tothe Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and ChildPornography, May 25, 2000, 2171 U.N.T.S. 227, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.101. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, available athttp://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.102. Id.103. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2256 (2008).
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federal courts to have jurisdiction.  Otherwise, individual states will have
jurisdiction.  In this regard, some states have a different definition of child
pornography. For example, Maryland law makes it illegal to "knowingly promote,
advertise, solicit, distribute, or possess with the intent to distribute [an image] . . .
that depicts a minor engaged in . . . sexual conduct . . . [or] in a manner that reflects
the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the [image] depicts a
minor engaged [in] ... sexual conduct."  In Maryland, for a person to be convicted of
possessing child pornography, the image needs to depict a minor under the age or
16, rather than 18, as required by U.S. law and the Optional Protocol.104
Another example of a federalism issue relates to the United States’
implementation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR).  Article
36 of the VCCR provides for a right of consular notification and access for foreign
nationals arrested or detained in the United States.105 Because most persons in the
United States are arrested or detained by state or local police, the federal
government relies on these sub-federal officers to carry out U.S. treaty obligations
in this regard.  However, many local and state police did not comply with this treaty
obligation, leading to hundreds of lawsuits in U.S. courts,106 as well as three cases
against the United States at the ICJ.107 These failures to provide consular
notification and access also negatively impacted U.S. foreign relations with States
like Mexico.108 While the Senate did not attach a federalism understanding to the
VCCR, this example demonstrates the potential for federalism issues that may
result in uneven implementation of treaty obligations throughout the United States.
Tied with federalism conditions in terms of frequency are conditions that disallow
the use of a particular dispute settlement body to resolve treaty disputes, most
commonly, the ICJ. The United States has on seven occasions entered a reservation
excluding or conditioning the use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as the
proper dispute settlement body to resolve disputes that arise out of a multilateral
104. MD. CODEANN. CRIM. LAW §§ 11-201, 11-207, 11-208 (West 2009).105. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.106. Cindy Galway Buys et al., Do Unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance with Consular No-
tification Rights, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’LL. 461 (2011).
107. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand Case(Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).108. See Violations of the Vienna Convention in U.S. Death Penalty Cases, Statement of Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton, submitted to the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 27, 2011,
available at http://users.xplornet.com/~mwarren/editorials.htm. See also Letter of Arturo Sarukhan,Mexican Ambassador to the United States,Why enforcing the Vienna Convention Makes Sense (May7, 2008), available at http://elobservadorarizonamexico.com/noticias/1661-why-enforcing-the-vi-enna-convention-makes-sense.
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treaty.109 The United States’ reservation to the Genocide Convention stating that
the United States must give its explicit consent on a case-by-case basis before the
ICJ may take jurisdiction over any disputes relating to the United States’ obligations
under the Convention illustrates this type of reservation.  In addition to opting out
of ICJ jurisdiction, the United States has excluded the use of a particular type of
arbitral tribunal in three multilateral treaties.
The next most common type of condition is a non-self-executing declaration by the
Senate, which states that some or all of the provisions of treaty will not become
effective in U.S. law until the Congress passes implementing legislation.  This type
of declaration can affect the United States’ treaty obligations because the treaty is
not legally enforceable in U.S. courts until such implementing legislation is passed.
For example, when the United States joined the ICCPR, it added a declaration that
articles 1-27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.110 Congress has never enacted
legislation specifically to implement the ICCPR.  As a result, it is not possible for
private litigants in U.S. courts to rely on the rights set forth in the ICCPR.  If the
treaty obligations are not enforceable, the United States’ treaty partners may
wonder what legal obligations the United States has actually undertaken. The
United States may take the position that implementing legislation is not necessary
because other U.S. laws already protect many of the rights set forth in the ICCPR.
However, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has identified areas in which the
United States is not in compliance with its obligations under the ICCPR.111
Moreover, it may be argued based on the principle of pacta sunt servanda that the
United States has a good faith obligation to ensure that when it ratifies a non-self-
executing treaty those treaty obligations are fully enforceable in domestic law.
This section demonstrates that the varied nature and usage of declarations, along
with the overlap between understandings and declarations, can lead to confusion
and uncertainty.  More clarity and simplicity is needed in this area of law.  One
possible solution would be to amend the VCLT to add a definition of a declaration
109. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (U.S. reservations, understandings and declarations are available athttps://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec). Professor Galbraith’s recent work suggests that whether a Stateagrees to dispute settlement before the ICJ has more to do with the way the dispute settlementclause is framed within the treaty (i.e., as an opt in or opt out clause) rather than with rational choicetheory. Jean Galbraith, Treaty Options: Towards a Behavioral Understanding of Treaty Design, 53VA. J. INT’LL. 309, 314-15 (2013).110. ICCPR, supra note 55 (U.S. reservations, understandings and declarations are available as part ofICCPR Status, UN Treaty Collection, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en.
111. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee considers report of the United States, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS:OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER (March, 14 2014),http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14383&LangID=E.
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and to specify the legal effect of declarations.  Another possibility would be for the
United Nations General Assembly to more formally adopt the International Law
Commission’s Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, perhaps giving it more
persuasive legal authority, and charging it with addressing the issue of
understandings more specifically.  Either of these actions would bring more clarity
to this area of the law.
The ILC’s work on treaty conditions continues as of this writing.  The author
urges the ILC to expand its work to identify and define other types of conditions
beyond simply reservations and interpretive declarations.  For example, the United
Nations Treaty Collection Definitions recognizes several other types of declarations
besides just interpretive declarations, as follows:
Declarations that are intended to have binding effects could be classified as
follows:
(a) A declaration can be a treaty in the proper sense. [Example omitted.]
(b) An interpretative declaration is an instrument that is annexed to a treaty with
the goal of interpreting or explaining the provisions of the latter.
(c) A declaration can also be an informal agreement with respect to a matter of
minor importance.
(d) A series of unilateral declarations can constitute binding agreements.112
Clarifying and defining the legal effect of different types of declarations will help
treaty parties understand what their legal obligations are, as well as those of their
treaty partners. It would also help courts and other tribunals tasked with
interpreting a treaty to better understand and apply the parties’ treaty obligations.
In addition, the ILC could examine the use of “understandings” in state practice
and make recommendations as to whether such conditions should be given
recognition under international law.  If the ILC were to conclude that
“understandings” should be given recognition, it could also opine as to the weight or
effect of such conditions on States’ treaty obligations.
3. Are conditions more frequently added to certain types of treaties?
Having examined the types of conditions and their frequency of use in the
aggregate, this next section considers whether there is a correlation between the
addition of conditions and the treaty’s subject matter.  In this regard, the data
demonstrates clear differences in the occurrence of conditions depending in the
subject matter of the treaty.  The United States is most likely to add conditions to
112. Definition of key terms used in the UN Treaty Collection, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/definition/page1_en.xml#declarations (last visitedFeb 21, 2016).
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multilateral treaties relating to judicial and legal matters (9 of 13 or 69%); cultural
matters (5 out of 8 or 62%); non-nuclear weapons (5 of 8 or 62%); transnational crime
(10 of 18 or 55%) and human rights (10 of 19 or 53%).113 The remainder of the data
is set forth in Graph C below.
Graph C: Conditions by Treaty Category
Of note, the following 11 categories of treaties (out of 30) have no conditions at all:
Subject Matter (number of treaties)
Antarctica (2)
Country-specific treaties (12)
Diplomatic and consular relations (3)
Energy (44)
Harmonization (12)
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The reasons States enter into treaties vary and may affect their interest in
conditioning their treaty obligations.  Most States enter into human rights treaties
for expressive purposes, i.e., “to signal their adherence to global cultural norms.”114
Many human rights treaties also codify customary international law norms such as
the right to a fair trial or even jus cogens norms like the prohibition on genocide and,
thus, States may not excuse themselves from compliance with these norms by way
of treaty conditions.  By contrast, trade treaties are based on reciprocity.115 Each
State agrees to abide by certain trade rules that open up domestic markets to foreign
competitors so as to have equal access to foreign markets.  For example, the United
States may agree to reduce tariffs on computers from Japan if Japan agrees to
reduce tariffs on U.S. beef.  Thus, one might expect fewer conditions being attached
to trade treaties because such conditions would upset the delicate bargain struck.
The data tends to support this hypothesis in that the United States has added
conditions to human rights treaties 53% of the time, while it has added conditions
to trade treaties only 14% of the time.
Professor Kirgis has suggested States are less likely to add reservations to
treaties that govern private conduct, citing the Convention on the International Sale
of Goods (CISG) and the Hague Convention on International Child Abduction, as
examples.116 The CISG falls in the category of trade and commerce which, as noted
above, has a low number of conditions, perhaps supporting Professor Kirgis’s
statement. In fact, Article 98 of the CISG limits the ability of States parties to make
reservations to only those expressly allowed by the CISG.117 On the other hand, the
Convention on International Child Abduction falls in the category of Judicial and
Legal Matters, which is the subject matter category with the highest percentage of
conditions.  There are 13 treaties in this category; 9 of which contain conditions
114. Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM.J. INT’LL. 1, 12 (2012).115. Id. at 30.116. Frederic L. Kirgis,Reservations to Treaties and United States Practice, ASIL INSIGHT (May 4, 2003),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/11/reservations-treaties-and-united-states-practice. Professor Kirgis does not reference any empirical data in support of this statement.117. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489U.N.T.S. 3.
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(including 4 having reservations).  Included in this category are four State
Department sub-categories: judicial procedure (8), arbitration (2), and private
international law (2), and investment disputes (1).  There are no conditions attached
to the treaties on private international law or investment disputes.  Both arbitration
treaties have conditions and 7 out of 8 treaties dealing with judicial procedure have
conditions, including the Convention on International Child Abduction, to which the
United States made two reservations.  Many of these treaties actually regulate both
public and private conduct; thus, it is difficult to support Professor Kirgis’s assertion
that treaties governing private conduct are less likely to have reservations or other
conditions attached.
Professor Kennedy’s data showed the Senate was most likely to add conditions to
tax treaties (24%)118 and least likely to add conditions to intellectual property and
environmental treaties (7%).119 The data singling out multilateral treaties is
consistent with Professor Kennedy’s conclusion that tax treaties are more likely to
have conditions (1 out of 2 or 50%),  as compared to intellectual property (16.6%) or
environmental treaties (14.8%).  However, tax treaties are much more likely to be
bilateral than multilateral, so this particular sample size involving multilateral tax
treaties is too small to allow definitive conclusions.
Professors Auerswald and Maltzman also examined both bilateral and
multilateral treaties of the United States from 1947 to 2000 to determine whether
the subject matter of the treaty affected the addition of reservations.120 They divided
the treaties into two groups: high politics and low politics.121 “High politics” treaties
are those involving security matters, such as peace agreements and nonproliferation
treaties, as well as sovereignty issues, such as establishing borders or diplomatic
relations between States.122 “Low politics” treaties fall into three subcategories: (1)
economic, dealing with trade coordination, double taxation and international labor
standards, (2) legal treaties dealing with extradition and other legal standards of
behavior, and (3) other treaties that establish behavioral norms such as human
rights or environmental treaties.123 They theorized U.S. Senators pay more attention
to treaties dealing with matters of high politics than those dealing with low politics
and, hence, Senators are more likely to attach reservations to high politics treaties
118. It is important to remember in comparing data that Professor Kennedy’s data includes bilateral taxtreaties, whereas the database for this article only includes multilateral tax treaties. Kennedy, supranote 76, at 124.  His data set also ends in 1990, whereas the current data set includes an additionaldecade of data.119. See id.120. Auerswald & Maltzman, supra note 84, at 1103-04.  Their data focused only on reservations, notother types of conditions.121. Id. at 1103.122. Id.123. Id.
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to clarify U.S. obligations.124 Their theory was supported by their data, which
demonstrated that Senators were more likely to add reservations to high politics
treaties.125
When reservations are separated out from other types of conditions, the current
data set confirms that reservations are more likely to be added to “high politics”
treaties (23% of the time) as compared to “low politics” treaties (13% of the time).
However, when all types of conditions are considered, the opposite pattern emerges.
The current data set shows that Senators are more likely to add conditions to “low
politics” treaties (20% of the time) than “high politics” treaties (11% of the time).
One possible explanation for this difference may be that less cost is perceived in
adding conditions other than reservations to treaties because they do not require a
formal acceptance or objection from the other treaty parties and, therefore, do not
pose as much risk to the treaty relationship. However, exactly why this difference
appears will require more exploration by scholars in the future.
When considering why the Senate uses conditions for different types of treaties,
in addition to issues of “high” politics versus “low” politics, prior scholarship suggests
that the U.S. constitutional and electoral system make it necessary for the federal
government to use flexible treaty arrangements for at least two reasons:  (1)
politicians must deliver on any promises made or they will face negative
consequences at the ballot box,126 and (2) the courts are predisposed to align
domestic law with international commitments.127 The ability to add conditions to
treaties provides some flexibility in adapting those treaties to the U.S. legal and
political system.
The data suggests another reason for the Senate’s use of conditions is respect for
the structure of the U.S. government.  Several of the more common types of
conditions, including the federalism understanding, the non-self-executing
declaration, and the dispute settlement reservations, attempt to preserve power for
the state government or co-equal branches of the federal government.  For example,
the federalism understanding is clearly designed to allow states to continue to
124. Id. at 1100.125. Id. at 1104.  They also concluded bilateral treaties were more likely to have reservations than mul-tilateral treaties because the stakes were lower with bilateral treaties.126. B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Un-
certainty and Escape, 55 INT’LORG. 829, 831 (2001).127. Emilia Justyna Powell & Jeffrey K. Staton,Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty
Violation, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 149, 151-52 (2009). Professor Helfer points out many treaties that pro-hibit reservations have adopted differential treatment regimes for less developed countries to en-courage their participation in lieu of a system of unilateral reservations. Lawrence R. Helfer, Not
Fully Committed? Reservations, Risk and Treaty Design, 31 YALE J. INT’LL. 367, 377 (2006).  Politi-cians may also use foreign or international models to influence the making of domestic policy. SeeKATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICYDIFFUSION 18-19, 21-22, 175 (OxfordUniversity Press, 1st ed. 2013).
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exercise regulatory authority in areas of traditional state regulation, such as
criminal law.128 As international law reaches more and more into areas that used
to be governed primarily or exclusively by domestic law, and the number of States
in the international community has grown, more States may believe it necessary to
modify treaty obligations to fit their various domestic legal systems.
In the United States’ constitutional structure, the non-self-executing treaty
doctrine gives both houses of Congress – not just the Senate – the ability to have a
voice in how a treaty is implemented in the domestic legal system by requiring the
passage of implementing legislation.  The requirement of implementing legislation
may lead to more “buy in” to the treaty obligations because the state representatives
in the House as well as the Senate are educated about the treaty obligations and
have a role in shaping how they will be implemented in domestic law.  For example,
when the United States joined the Convention Against Torture, the Senate added a
declaration stating that Articles 1-16 of CAT are non-self-executing and included an
“understanding” of the meaning of “lawful sanctions” that incorporated both
domestic and international law.129 The United States then passed legislation to
implement CAT through the Torture Victims Protection Act.130
In addition to preserving U.S. sovereignty, reservations opting out of
international dispute settlement mechanisms may act to preserve a role for the
federal courts in interpreting and applying treaty obligations of the United States.
For example, the United States entered reservations opting out of dispute
settlement at the International Court of Justice under the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances;131
the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption;132 the Convention on Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident;133 the International Convention on the
128. See, e.g., Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, 2296 U.N.T.S. 167.129. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane Or Degrading TreatmentOr Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
130. Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1992). When considering ratification of theCAT, concern was expressed regarding the meaning of “lawful sanctions” in Article 1’s definitionof torture. “A majority of the committee agrees with the Administration’s position that the termshould be defined with reference to both domestic and international law and therefore has in-cluded the administration’s proposed understanding on this matter in the resolution of ratifica-tion.” CLAIBORNE PELL, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30 (1990), available athttp://detaineetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/S.-Comm.-on-Foreign-Relations-Re-port-on-Convention-Against-Torture-and-Other-Cruel-Inhuman-or-Degrading-Treatment-or-Punishment-S.-Exec.-Rep.-No_.pdf.131. United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances,Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95.132. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-15, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).133. Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Sept. 26, 1986, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 100-20,1439 U.N.T.S. 276.
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;134 the Genocide Convention;135
and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.136 The United States also added an
“understanding” to its ratification of the Protocol on Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices in which it states, “The United States shall
not recognize the jurisdiction of any international tribunal to prosecute a United
States citizen for a violation of the Protocol or the Convention on Conventional
Weapons.”137 Similarly, with respect to the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification, the United States added an “understanding” stating that it “declines
to recognize as compulsory either of the dispute settlement means set out in Article
. . . For any dispute arising from this Convention, the United States does not
recognize or accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.”138
Whether U.S. courts can hear cases involving treaty disputes will depend on
jurisdictional issues and justiciability doctrines, such as political question and Act
of State doctrines.
Respect for the structure of the U.S. government also helps to explain why the
United States is more likely to add conditions to certain types of treaties.  As noted
above, the United States is most likely to add conditions to treaties dealing with
judicial and legal matters, cultural matters, non-nuclear weapons, crime, and
human rights.  With the possible exception of some of the weapons treaties,139 all of
these areas are areas where the federal government shares much of its power with
the state governments. Thus, it is understandable the Senate may wish to preserve
a role for the states or for other branches of the federal government when consenting
to a treaty that touches on these matters.  In fact, Senators have made statements
that support this theory. 140 The comments of other Senators, however, suggest that
134. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 110.135. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 38.136. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children inArmed Conflict, May 25, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13094, 2173 U.N.T.S. 222.137. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices asAmended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II), Oct. 10, 1980, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-2, 2048 U.N.T.S. 93.138. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing SeriousDrought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Oct. 14, 1994, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 106-25, 1954U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Convention to Combat Desertification].139. For example, the federal government generally controls issues relating to chemical and biologicalweapons.140. For example, in explaining their opposition to U.S. ratification of U.N. Convention on the Law of theSea, Senators Rob Portman and Kelly Ayotte made the following statement: "Unlike many interna-tional agreements, key provisions of the Law of the Sea treaty are drafted to be “self-executing,”meaning that certain tribunal judgments would automatically constitute enforceable federal law,without congressional legislation or meaningful review by our nation’s judiciary. . . . In other words,the treaty equates tribunal decisions with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. This means thatprivate litigants will likely be able to invoke tribunal judgments as enforceable in U.S. courts —
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they are opposed to any international agreement that would limit U.S. sovereignty
regardless of the subject matter of the treaty.141
While respect for the U.S. Constitutional structure is appropriate, it can be taken
too far, preventing the United States from entering into treaties that would be
beneficial to the United States and the international community by securing
reciprocal benefits and promoting the rule of law. Alternatively, differences in state
and federal law may cause the United States to violate treaty obligations it does
undertake.142 As demonstrated by the examples of the CRC OP and the VCCR
above, if the federal government does not sufficiently educate and monitor state
implementation of treaty obligations, some states may not implement those
obligations at all or may do so in inconsistent or conflicting ways.  Accordingly, the
United States will have to weigh in each case the value of joining the treaty against
the possible encroachment on the traditional functions of state governments and the
three branches of the federal government.
B. Does a Prohibition on Reservations Hinder United States’ Entry
into a Treaty?
Some treaties prohibit the making of any reservations to the treaty’s text at all,
or prohibit reservations except to specific treaty provision(s).  Often, this prohibition
results from the belief that the multilateral treaty is a “package deal.”143 The
compromises reached during the negotiation process are hard won and to pick and
choose among treaty provisions after the fact would upset the balance struck.144
Other times, a prohibition on reservations is included because the treaty is
legislative in nature, requiring uniform application.145
against the government and possibly against U.S. businesses. The United States will have no lawfulchoice but to acquiesce to tribunal judgments, however burdensome or unfair . . . [W]e are deeplyconcerned about the treaty’s breadth and ambiguity, the inadequate U.S. input in the treaty’s adju-dicative bodies, and the automatic enforcement of tribunal judgments in the United States . . . Thereal issue is not whether the United States will defend its maritime rights, but ratherwho will havethe final say on the scope of those rights. We simply are not persuaded that decisions by the Inter-national Seabed Authority and international tribunals empowered by this treaty will be more favor-able to U.S. interests than bilateral negotiations, voluntary arbitration, and other traditional meansof resolving maritime issues."  Press Release, Senators Portman and Ayotte Sink Law of the Sea
Treaty (July 16, 2012), available at http://www.portman.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-re-leases?ID=a886f01e-1b08-4c51-bf7e-4bad33194c0b.141. See discussion infra Part III. B.142. For example, some U.S. Senators have refused to give their advice to the CEDAW because of con-cerns regarding domestic legal conflicts.143. See Kirgis, supra note 117.144. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867U.N.T.S. 154; infra Annexes at 412.145. See Kirgis, supra note 117.
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This section examines some well-known multilateral treaties the United States
has not joined, as well as those it has, to determine how a prohibition on treaty
reservations may affect U.S. foreign policy.  It also considers whether certain types
of treaties are more likely to contain a prohibition on reservations.
In this latter regard, the U.N. Final Clauses of Multilateral Treaties Handbook
states, “Treaties in the environmental field often prohibit reservations.”146 The data
does not seem to support this conclusion, at least for the environmental treaties to
which the United States is a party because only 4 of these 27 multilateral treaties
relating to the environment prohibit reservations.
In fact, the most common type of treaty with a prohibition on reservations are
treaties dealing with trade and commerce (15).  This is consistent with the idea that
reservations should not be permitted where the treaty is considered a “package
deal.”  The second most common type of treaty with a prohibition on reservations
are treaties dealing with marine and maritime matters (10), with intellectual
property treaties taking a close third (8).  16 out of 30 different subject matter
categories have at least one treaty that prohibits reservations.147 Thus, it is difficult
to conclude there is a correlation between a treaty’s subject matter and whether the
treaty will allow reservations.
The UN Handbook also observes that, “other treaties implicitly prohibit
reservations,” giving the example of international labor conventions that prohibit
reservations to bring uniformity to labor conditions worldwide.148 While none of the
labor treaties in the database expressly prohibit reservations, the obligation to
unconditionally accept the obligations of the ILO Convention has been interpreted
to mean that reservations to ILO conventions are prohibited.149
Over the years, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has expressed concern
regarding treaties that prohibit reservations, stating, “In the committee’s view, such
a provision has the effect of preventing the Senate from exercising its constitutional
duty to give advice and consent to a treaty.” 150 This statement raises the question
as to whether a prohibition on reservations is in fact a hindrance to treaty
ratification or whether there are other factors at play that cause a treaty not to
receive a favorable recommendation of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In addition to the treaties in the database to which the United States is a party,
146. FINALCLAUSES OFMULTILATERALTREATIESHANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 47.147. See infra Annex B at 416 (displaying a list of treaties by subject matter that prohibit reservations).148. See FINALCLAUSES OFMULTILATERALTREATIESHANDBOOK, supra note 46, at 47-48. The labor trea-ties are an example of legislative treaties where uniformity is desired.149. See EBERE OSIEKE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOURORGANIZATION 20 (1985); cf.ANTHONYAUST, MODERNTREATYLAW ANDPRACTICE 122 (3d ed. 2013).Interpretive declarations may be allowed, however.150. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 125.
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over the last five decades, U.S. presidents have recommended adoption of an
additional 22 multilateral treaties that are still pending in the Senate.151 There are
several well-known recent examples where the Senate thus far has failed to give its
advice and consent to major multilateral treaties, despite urging from the executive
branch.  For example, several presidents from both the political parties have urged
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 152
but the Senate has not complied. 153 Likewise, President Obama’s Administration
has urged ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW)154 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities155 and yet the Senate again has not given its advice and
consent.
Often, these treaties have stalled in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
where powerful Committee Chairmen or other influential Senators on the
Committee have opposed adoption of these treaties.  For example, when Senator
Jesse Helms was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1995-
2001, he was famous for using his position and the Senate’s rules to stall or block
adoption of a number of multilateral treaties, such as the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty,156 the Kyoto Protocol,157 CEDAW,158 the U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child,159 and the International Criminal Court.160
151. Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Apr. 27, 2015),http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/.152. President George W. Bush, President’s Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World’s Oceans,THE WHITE HOUSE (May 15, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/re-leases/2007/05/20070515-2.html; AndrewBurt,Why U.S. Senate should ratify Law of the Sea Treaty,THEHILL (May 25, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/229559-why-us-senate-should-ratify-law-of-the-sea-treaty.153. Zach Colman,Republican Senator says sea treaty might pass after election, THEHILL (Aug. 17, 2012,2:32 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/244101-murkowski-sea-treaty-might-pass-in-lame-duck.154. Thirtieth Anniversary of the United Nations’ Adoption of CEDAW, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE (Dec. 18,2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/dec/133893.htm.155. Disabilities, THEWHITEHOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/disabilities (last visited Feb 24,2016).156. WILLIAMA.LINK, RIGHTEOUSWARRIOR: JESSEHELMS AND THERISE OFMODERNCONSERVATISM 462(2008).157. Implications of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, Hearings before the S. Comm. on Foreign Re-
lations, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998) (statement of Sen. Helms).158. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 107-9, at 14 (2002).159. S. RES. 133, 104th Cong. (1995).
160. Is a U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Int’l Operations of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statementof Sen. Helms). Some research suggests the likelihood of a reservation being attached to a treatydoes not increase when the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is from a different
political party than the President. Auerswald and Maltzman, supra note 84, at 1106 (Furtherexamination of the connection between political parties and treaty ratification will likely be thesubject of a later article).
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In explaining their opposition to certain treaties, some Senators have argued U.S.
law is already sufficient and these new legal norms are not needed; or to adopt the
treaty would be to give up a measure of sovereignty and to subject the United States
to unwanted international scrutiny and criticism.161 These Senators suggest the
only types of treaties the United States should sign are those that advance “a specific
U.S. security or economic interest.”162 Some Senators also argued the treaty might
infringe on U.S. law.163 In particular, some Senators suggested they must add
conditions “to protect the Constitution” and objected to subjecting the United States
to review by the ICJ.164
Adding one or more conditions to a treaty during the Senate ratification process
could ameliorate some of these concerns.  For example, both CEDAW and the
Disabilities Convention allow reservations.  If the United States wanted to ratify
these treaties to demonstrate its commitment to these human rights issues, it could
do so subject to certain conditions that modify objectionable treaty obligations, so
long as the conditions are not contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty.
Research suggests imprecision or ambiguity in treaty language can lead to
greater cooperation.165 It allows States that join to interpret the treaty to fit each
domestic legal system.  The use of treaty conditions may operate in the same way.
In other words, the United States could join more treaties because of the ability to
adapt the treaty to its own needs through the addition of conditions.  Use of
conditions is not an objectionable practice per se, so long as the practice is
transparent and the conditions are not contrary to the basic object and purpose of
the treaty or international law more generally. Of course, the downside of adding
conditions is less uniformity in international legal obligations.  Persons affected by
the treaty may not have the exactly same rights under the same treaty in different
161. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-6, at 17-19 (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112erpt6/html/CRPT-112erpt6.htm; See also Press Release, Senators Portman and Ayotte Sink Law
of the Sea Treaty, supra note 141.162. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 112-6, at 19.
163. Id. These Senators incorrectly assert that ratification of the Disabilities Convention would leadto that Convention having the same legal authority as the U.S. Constitution. Of course, the U.S.Supreme Court in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), long ago established the U.S. Constitutiontrumps any inconsistent treaty obligations; S. EXEC. REP. NO. 101-30, at 4 (1990), available athttp://detaineetaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/S.-Comm.-on-Foreign-Relations-Re-
port-on-Convention-Against-Torture-and-Other-Cruel-Inhuman-or-Degrading-Treatment-or-Punishment-S.-Exec.-Rep.-No_.pdf. Similar concerns were also raised and addressed during theratification process for the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment.164. Convention Against Torture: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st Cong.(1990) (statements of Sen. Helms and Pressler), available at http://babel.ha-
thitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=pst.000016129474;view=1up;seq=1.165. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’LORG. 421, 423 (2000).
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States.  In addition, such practice may also hinder the ability of the international
community to raise the lowest common denominator.  Thus, use of conditions to
modify treaty obligations must be done with care.
Adding conditions is not possible with respect to all of these pending treaties,
however.  Some, such as UNCLOS and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,
do not allow any reservations.166 As noted above, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has expressed concern regarding treaties that prohibit reservations.167
Despite that sentiment, the United States has joined 59 treaties that prohibit
reservations.   Thus, a prohibition on reservations does not appear to be a bar to U.S.
joinder where the U.S. Senate determines the overall benefits of the treaty outweigh
its concern for the lack of reservations. Additionally, the use of declarations to clarify
matters rather than reservations may assist in overcoming such concerns.  Once
again, however, care must be exercised to insure that these “declarations” are not
reservations in disguise.
There are also occasions when a treaty prohibits reservations, yet the United
States attached conditions that may attempt to circumvent the prohibition.168 For
example, Article 37 of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in
those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly
in Africa, prohibits reservations.169 Yet the United States entered conditions to
clarify that the United States does not have financial obligations in certain cases; it
does not need to implement any plans pursuant to the treaty; and it does not accept
the dispute resolution means outlined in the treaty.170 Similarly, Article 27 of the
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of February 14, 1967 for the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America also prohibits reservations.171 Upon signing the
treaty, the United States made a statement regarding several matters under the
treaty, including the effect of the treaty on the status of its claims to certain
166. Several States have, however, entered interpretive declarations to various articles of UNCLOS, someof which may actually be considered improper reservations. SeeMichael Wood, Institutional Aspects
of the Guide to Practice on Reservations, 24 EURO. J. INT’LL. 1099 (2013).167. CONGRESSIONALRESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 9, at 125.168. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adop-tion, May 29, 1993, SEN. EXEC. REP. 106-14, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167.169. Convention to Combat Desertification, supra note 139.170. See Status of Treaties, Chapter XXVII: Environment, 10. United Nations Convention to CombatDesertification In Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particu-larly In Africa, U. N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-10&chapter=27&lang=en#EndDec.171. Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of February 14, 1967 for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons inLatin America, Feb. 14, 1967, T.I.A.S. 10147, 634 U.N.T.S. 362, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20634/volume-634-I-9068-English.pdf.
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territories, as well as regarding the interpretation of certain treaty provisions.172 If
any of these conditions operate to modify the United States’ treaty obligations, they
may actually be reservations and thus prohibited by the express terms of the
respective treaties.
No clear patterns emerge from the data on treaties that prohibit reservations.
The data does not conclusively show a clear relationship between a prohibition on
reservations and U.S. ratification or non-ratification of the treaty. Nor does the data
clearly support a relationship between the subject matter of the treaty and the
likelihood the treaty will prohibit reservations.
IV. Is U.S. treaty practice consistent with international law and
foreign practice?
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly permits reservations to
treaties under certain circumstances.173 And, increasingly, customary international
law recognizes the use of certain kinds of declarations.174 International law does
not, however, formally recognize “understandings,” as demonstrated by the lack of
mention of understandings in the VCLT, the UN Treaty Collection definitions, or
the ILC Guide.
Despite a lack of formal recognition for some of these conditions, all three types
of these conditions are used in international treaty practice to a varying extent.  The
use of reservations is a common practice as is demonstrated by the reservations
attached to many of the treaties in the UN Treaty Collection.175 Declarations of
various types also appear to be quite common.176 By contrast, conditions labelled
“understandings” are quite rare in international treaty practice.
A. The Use of “Understandings” in International Treaty Practice
On the assumption that the more parties to the treaty, the more likely it is parties
will attach conditions, the author surveyed every treaty in the database with more
than 150 parties, a total of 91 treaties.177 The majority of treaties have no
172. See id.173. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 19.174. SeeDefinition of Key Terms Used in UN Treaty Collection, supra note 53; Guide to Practice on Res-ervations to Treaties, supra note 43.175. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, U. N. TREATY COLLECTION,https://treaties.un.org/pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2016).176. See id.177. The author made this assumption because the large number of treaty parties means greater oppor-tunities to add conditions and a greater variety of domestic legal systems into which the treaty must
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“understandings” at all.  In fact, only 18 out of the 91 treaties surveyed contain a
condition labelled “understanding.”
The United States was by far the most frequent user of conditions labelled
“understanding,” accounting for the addition of “understandings” to 10 of those 18
treaties.178 Only six States other than the United States added a condition to one of
these 91 treaties labelled “understanding” and five of those States only added an
understanding a single time.  Besides the United States, Kuwait was the only other
State to add “understandings” to more than one treaty. It added the same
understanding relating to its non-recognition of Israel to six different treaties.  Thus,
the United States and Kuwait combined account for 16 out of 18 “understandings.”
Similar to Kuwait, Sudan was the only State out of 190 parties that added an
“understanding” to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), to the
effect that its ratification of the VCDR does not imply its recognition of Israel.179 Out
of 174 parties to the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,
Dominica was the only State to add an “understanding” seeking to clarify that “the
Convention prohibits the taking of hostages in any circumstances, even those
referred to in article 12.”180 There were three treaties where another State joined the
United States in adding a condition labelled “understanding” – Argentina added an
“understanding” to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Bangladesh added an “understanding” to the 1999 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; and the Netherlands added an “understanding”
to the 1998 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs.
In light of the fact that a few other States have occasionally attached
“understandings” to their treaty ratification documents, it cannot be said the United
be accommodated, thus necessitating an increased need to use conditions to tailor treaty obligationsto fit the variety of domestic legal systems.178. These treaties are: The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on Sale ofChildren, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; the International Convention for the Suppres-sion of Financing of Terrorism; the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb-ing; the International Plant Protection Convention; the United Nations Convention to Combat Des-ertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, particularlyAfrica; the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;the 1984 Convention Against Torture; the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;and the 1998 United Nations Convention Against the Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psy-chotropic Substances; and the Protocol of 1978 relating to the International Convention for the Pre-vention of Pollution from Ships.179. Status of Treaties, Chapter III: Privileges and Immunities, Diplomatic and Consular Relations, etc.,3. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, U. N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-3&chapter=3&lang=en (last vis-ited Feb. 24, 2016). In fact, non-recognition of Israel was the most common understanding added byother states, accounting for 10 of the understandings.180. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205, avail-
able at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-5&chapter=18&lang=en#EndDec.
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States’ use of “understandings” in treaty practice is completely inconsistent with
international practice.  However, it may certainly be said the United States is a more
frequent user of understandings than other States.181 It is also true that even taking
into account U.S. practice, the use of “understandings” as such is quite rare in
international treaty practice.
B. The Use of “Declarations” in International Treaty Practice
The use of “declarations” to explain a State’s “understanding” of the meaning of a
treaty provision is much more common. Using the same 91 treaties, there were 80
States that entered “declarations” explaining their “understanding” of a particular
treaty provision.182 For example, there are no conditions labelled “understandings”
for the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, a treaty with 177 parties,
although Egypt added a statement in which it explains its “understanding” of who
is entitled to immunity under the Convention.183 Other examples demonstrating
the confusion between declarations and understandings may be found in conditions
attached to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing.
At least seven parties to that treaty made “declarations” stating their
“understanding” of how particular treaty terms should be interpreted or applied.184
Thus, as in U.S. treaty practice, there is much overlap between declarations and
understandings in international treaty practice. The lack of international uniformity
181. One of the explanations as to why the United States is a more frequent user of conditions may be itsconstitutional system for treaty ratification, which gives the U.S. Senate the opportunity to add newconditions during the advice and consent process after the U.S. President has negotiated the termsof the treaty.  In this regard, the U.S. system is unlike some other Westminster-style democracies(e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), which provide for little role for parliamentaryparticipation in the treaty ratification process, although that may be changing. See Joanna Harring-ton, Scrutiny and Approval: The Role for Westminster-Style Parliaments in Treaty-Making, 55 INT’L& COMP. L.Q. 121, 122-23 (2006).  Interestingly, despite Ireland’s historical ties to Britain, Irelandfollows the U.S. model, with a constitutional provision requiring parliamentary approval of treaties.Constitution of Ireland of 1937, art. 29.6. Likewise, South Africa has amended its constitution toprovide a role for parliament in the treaty-making process. See S. AFR. CONST., art. 231, 1996.182. See infra Annex C.183. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S 261, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-6&chapter=3&lang=en.
184. For example, the Republic of Moldova added the following “Declaration”: “The Republic of Mol-dova declares its understanding that the provisions of article 12 of the International Conven-tion for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings should be implemented in such a way as to en-sure the inevitability of responsibility for the commission of offenses falling within the scope ofthe Convention, without prejudice to the effectiveness of the international cooperation on thequestions of extradition and legal assistance.”  Status of Treaties, Chapter XVIII:Penal Mat-
ters,  9. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, U. N. TREATYCOLLECTION, available at https://trea-ties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-9&chapter=18&lang=en.
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in adding “understandings” and “declarations” to treaties further underscores the
need for greater clarity and simplicity in this area.
Unlike understandings, the United Nations’ publications do recognize and define
“declarations” but also recognize different types of declarations.185 In particular, the
2011 ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties gives explicit recognition to
“interpretive declarations.”186 As a result, the U.S. Senate is on more solid legal
ground when it attaches a declaration to a treaty.  That said, U.S. treaty practice
may not always be completely consistent with international law. If the United States
attaches a declaration affecting the United States’ legal obligations under the treaty,
that declaration may need to be treated as a reservation.187 Thus, the most
important factor is the legal effect of a particular condition.
C. Other Types of Conditions Used in International Treaty Practice
In addition to conditions labelled as “reservations,” “understandings,” or
“declarations,” there are a few other behaviors observed in international treaty
practice regarding the use of conditions that add to the confusion in this field.  There
are some occasions when States have not used any of the more common labels
discussed above.   Instead, states attached a “statement” or an unlabeled sentence
to their acceptance of treaty obligations which sets forth their “understanding” or
“interpretation” of a particular treaty term.  In this regard, out of the 91 treaties
surveyed, 35 States attached some form of a statement purporting to interpret an
aspect of a particular treaty.  The actual intent and effect of these statements is
unclear.  Depending on the substance of the statement, they may be intended to
operate only domestically or they may be intended to have effect internationally.
Once again, if these statements actually modify the State’s legal obligations, they
should be treated as reservations.
D. Suggestions for Reforms
Given the rarity of “understandings” in international treaty practice, the
185. SeeDefinition of Key Terms Used in UN Treaty Collection, supra note 53; Guide to Practice on Res-ervations to Treaties, supra note 43.  The ILC Guide to Practice is not binding international law initself, but some of its previsions do reflect binding treaty provisions or customary international lawrules. See also Alain Pellet, The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties: A General Presen-
tation by the Special Rapporteur, 24 EURO. J. INT’LL. 1061, 1073 (2013).  Its purpose, however, is toassist States in formulating and responding to reservations and interpretive declarations. See Mi-chael Wood, Institutional Aspects of the Guide to Practice on Reservations, 24 EURO. J. INT’LL. 1099(2013).186. Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, supra note 43, § 1.2.187. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 2.1.
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inconsistent usage of the term, and the overlap with the use of “declarations,” it
would be prudent for the United States and the international community to simplify
treaty practice by discontinuing the use of “understandings” and other “statements”
in the treaty ratification process and rely solely on reservations and declarations to
condition their treaty obligations.  If a State uses a different label in its instrument
of ratification, the treaty depository body could return the instrument of ratification
for clarification.
The international community should also more formally adopt agreed upon
definitions of “declarations” to clarify how they may be used and the legal effect of
such declarations. One helpful change would be to change the label "declaration" to
something else like "opt in/opt out clause" when a State is accepting or declining the
jurisdiction of an international court or a treaty body, such as the ICJ or the ICCPR's
Human Rights Committee to help separate out and clarify the types of conditions
being added.
In addition, all conditions, regardless of their labels, should be notified to other
treaty parties so they may assess for themselves whether the conditions actually
affect a party’s legal obligations under the treaty.  If there is a legal effect,
notification allows the other treaty parties an opportunity to determine whether and
how to respond.
V. Legal Effect of Senate Conditions on Other Branches of the
Federal Government
Another concern related to the use of conditions in U.S. treaty practice is their
legal effect domestically.  When the U.S. Senate attaches one or more conditions to
a treaty undergoing the ratification process, is the President bound to include that
condition when depositing the instrument of ratification?  Must the President abide
by the condition when implementing the treaty?  Does the form of the condition
matter?  Are those conditions binding on U.S. courts involved in treaty
interpretation at a later date? If not, what weight should the courts give those
conditions?  All of these questions are addressed in this next section.
A. Is the Executive bound by Senate Conditions?
The Restatement (Third) of U.S. Foreign Relations Law § 314 takes the position
that because the President can only make a treaty with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the President is bound by any reservations or understandings of a
treaty’s meaning expressed by the Senate in the advice and consent process.  In this
regard, the Restatement provides:
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(1) When the Senate of the United States gives its advice and consent to a treaty
on condition that the United States enter a reservation, the President, if he makes
the treaty, must include the reservation in the instrument of ratification or
accession, or otherwise manifest that the adherence of the United States is subject
to the reservation.
(2) When the Senate gives its advice and consent to a treaty on the basis of a
particular understanding of its meaning, the President, if he makes the treaty, must
do so on the basis of the Senate’s understanding.
While the Restatement is not binding law, it has long been considered persuasive
authority.188 On the other hand, the Third Restatement has not been updated in
many years. The American Law Institute has begun a project to draft a fourth
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law taking into account substantial changes in
international law and foreign relations practice since 1987.189 It may be time to
reconsider U.S. foreign relations practice with respect to the use of conditions as part
of this process.
Professor Glennon argues the President is bound by at least certain conditions
imposed by the Senate.  In his view, the Senate has the power to determine how a
treaty will be implemented in U.S. law, thus giving it the power to enter binding
conditions upon its consent, at least with respect to the self-executing or non-self-
executing nature of the treaty.190 Professor Henkin likewise has opined that if the
Senate proviso is a condition of its consent to a treaty, the treaty can only take effect
subject to that condition.191
Other scholars take a different view.  Professors Riesenfeld and Abbott believe
the Senate lacks the constitutional authority to attach certain kinds of legally
binding conditions.192 In their view, the Senate only has the unicameral power to
consent to the ratification of treaties, not to pass domestic legislation.193 A Senate
declaration is not part of the treaty itself; rather, it is an expression of a U.S. policy
or position; thus it is akin to a stand-alone piece of domestic legislation.  The
President implements the treaty as part of his Article II powers as Chief Executive
Officer.194 According to Riesenfeld and Abbott, U.S. courts are not bound by Senate
conditions, because pursuant to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, only the treaty
188. WINER ET AL., INTERNATIONALLAWLEGALRESEARCH 242-43 (2013).189. Publications, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/publications/ (last visited Feb 24, 2016).190. Michael J. Glennon, The Constitutional Power of the United States Senate to Condition its Consent
to Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 533 (1991).191. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 135.192. PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THEMAKING AND OPERATION OF TREATIES 3 (Stefan A. Riesen-feld & Frederick M. Abbott eds., 1994).193. See id.194. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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itself is part of the Supreme Law of the Land.
The U.S. Constitution expressly gives the Senate a role in the treaty ratification
process, phrased as giving its “advice and consent” to the treaty.195 Having the
Senate participate in the treaty-making process gives some representative and
democratic legitimacy to a process increasingly handled by the Executive Branch.196
Accordingly, it is both appropriate and desirable for the Senate to express its consent
or lack thereof by voting on the treaty.  It is also appropriate and desirable for the
Senate to give the President its “advice” regarding the treaty. However, common
meanings of the word “advice” include “view,” “opinion,” “counsel” or
“recommendation,”197 words which generally do not connote a legally binding
obligation. Thus, the position of scholars such as Professors Glennon and Henkin
may be too absolute in this regard and there may be room for Presidents to treat at
least some of the Senate’s conditions as persuasive, but not legally binding.  It may
make more sense to treat reservations added by the Senate through the advice and
consent process as legally binding because they are intended to alter the United
States’ legal obligations under the treaty.  However, conditions with less clear legal
implications, such as declarations and understandings, may be entitled to less
deference and treated with less authority.
In fact, there is precedent for a President failing to include a Senate condition
during the ratification process and the court not enforcing that condition.198 In the
New York Indians case, the Senate gave its advice and consent subject to a condition
that, inter alia, the treaty would have no force or effect until it was submitted to and
freely accepted by certain Indian bands or tribes.199 The President did not include
the condition in his proclamation of ratification or in the published copy of the
treaty.200 The U.S. Supreme Court held the condition was not part of the treaty
because the other treaty parties did not have notice of it.  Hence, the U.S.
government could not rely on that condition in subsequent litigation over the treaty’s
meaning and effect.201 This case suggests the President has the final say as to
whether to include certain kinds of condition proposed by the Senate.
It is generally agreed that once a treaty is concluded, the Senate’s role is largely
195. Id.196. THEFLUIDSTATE: INTERNATIONALLAW ANDNATIONALLEGALSYSTEMS 57-58 (Hilary Charlesworthet al. eds., 2005) (discussing concerns regarding democratic deficits in treaty-making).197. Advice, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, available at: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defini-tion/english/advice198. SeeNew York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1 (1898).199. See id. at 21-22.200. See id. at 22-23.201. See id.
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over.202 For example, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations acknowledges
the President responds to conditions added by other States parties to the treaty
without consultation with the Senate.203 The Senate also has no ongoing role in
treaty interpretation.204 Professor Glennon takes the position that the President
interprets treaties, not the Senate, as long as executive interpretation does not
contradict Senate condition(s).205 According to Professor Glennon, if the President
disagrees with the Senate’s “understanding,” the time to make that objection is
before completion of the ratification process.206
Professor Glennon’s approach in this regard does seem to be a practical one even
if not completely consistent with the New York Indians case. If the President has
doubts about the legal effect of a particular condition attached by the Senate, it
would make sense for the President to attempt to resolve those doubts prior to
completing the ratification process to avoid uncertainty about the United States’
legal obligations, both domestically and internationally.
However, one can envision a situation where the executive branch does not
anticipate a particular legal issue arising and the executive is called upon to
implement the treaty in a way that causes it to question the condition originally
imposed by the Senate.  In such a case, it may be that the president, as the Chief
Executive Officer and the person charged with making treaties, believes the
condition is not consistent with the United States’ legal obligations under the treaty
because of the treaty’s interpretation and application by the treaty parties over time.
If the executive branch chooses to adopt a different interpretation of the treaty and
the Senate disagrees with the actions of the executive branch, the Senate could seek
judicial review to resolve the matter.207
In sum, there is strong support for the idea that the President is bound by
reservations attached by the Senate.  There is also support for the idea that the
President should, at a minimum, take other types of conditions proposed by the
Senate seriously and should even follow them most of the time out of respect for the
Senate’s role in the treaty-making process.  However, there should also be room for
the President to disagree with the Senate and, in the case of conflict, it may be
argued that the President’s view with respect to conditions other than reservations
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 326 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see FourteenDiamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901).203. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 314 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1987).204. HENKIN, supra note 48, at 136.205. Glennon, supra note 4, at 534; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 326(1)(AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“The President has the authority to determine the interpretation of an inter-national agreement asserted by the United States in its relation with other states.”).206. Glennon, supra note 4, at 535.207. That is, assuming such a lawsuit could survive any justiciability challenges such as the politicalquestion doctrine. SeeGoldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979).
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should prevail because he is the one chargedwith making and implementing treaties
and acts as the “sole organ” of the United States in foreign affairs.208
B. Are U.S. Courts bound by Conditions Added by the Senate?
In the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances, it has long been
established that the Supreme Court’s role is to say what the law is.209 Because
treaties are part of the supreme law of the land, the Supreme Court should also be
the final arbiter of the meaning of a treaty in U.S. law.210 Thus, it is appropriate for
the Supreme Court to have the final say regarding the meaning of a treaty in U.S.
domestic law.
Despite this well-established principle of judicial review, U.S. courts have often
been reluctant to seriously examine the validity of conditions added by the Senate
to a treaty. Commonly, the courts defer to the political branches on the ground that
the executive and legislative branches are the ones charged with making and
carrying out U.S. foreign policy.211 For example, there are multiple cases
challenging the U.S. interpretation and application of the Convention Against
Torture (CAT).  In those cases, the courts refused to adopt an interpretation different
from the “shared understanding” of the executive and legislative branches as set
forth in an understanding proposed by the President and adopted by Senate in the
ratification process.212 The President and Senate’s understanding alters the
definition of torture under the CAT to, inter alia, add a requirement of specific intent
to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and to require “prolonged
mental harm.”213 Neither of these requirements are found in the definition of torture
208. SeeUnited States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).209. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).210. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.211. See, e.g., SLOSS ET AL., INTERNATIONALLAW IN THEU.S. SUPREMECOURT: CONTINUITY ANDCHANGE253 (2011) (discussing U.S. Supreme Court’s deference to Executive Branch post-World War II toproject U.S. power).212. See, e.g., Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 131 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying a “specific intent” requirementunder CAT and its implementing legislation); see also, U.S. v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 806 (11th Cir.2010); Reyes Sanchez v. Ashcroft, 261 F. Supp. 2d 276, 291-92 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).213. The particular understanding reads as follows:
II. The Senate's advice and consent is subject to the following understandings, which shallapply to the obligations of the United States under this Convention:(1) (a) That with reference to article 1, the United States understands that, in order toconstitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mentalpain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm causedby or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical
pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened administration or ap-plication, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundlythe senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or (4) the threat that another
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in CAT.214 The Committee Against Torture specifically requested the United States
withdraw its understanding and modify its “restrictive interpretation” of CAT in
favor of one consistent with the treaty, suggesting that the U.S. interpretation may
even be contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty and therefore invalid.215
Despite this admonition, thus far, no U.S. court has been willing to examine the
validity of the understanding.216 Likewise, U.S. courts were reluctant to consider
the validity of the U.S. reservation to the ICCPR preserving the right to impose the
death sentence on juveniles,217 prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision that such
practice was unconstitutional.
A few courts have been more willing to examine conditions added to other treaties
by the Senate.  In these cases, courts have stated that although the Senate has
declared that particular treaty provisions are not self-executing, that is a
determination to be made by the courts.218 This practice raises the question of what
sources the courts should take into account when performing treaty interpretation
as well as the question of the relevant weight to be given to potentially competing
sources that may be used in the process.  Because reservations actually modify the
legal effect of a treaty provision and must be communicated to and either accepted
or rejected by the other treaty parties, there is no question that a valid reservation
must be implemented by a U.S. court.219 Understandings and declarations are more
complicated, however.  Each may profess to interpret one or more treaty provisions
in a particular way.  What weight should a court give to such interpretations? Should
person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the ad-ministration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated todisrupt profoundly the senses or personality.Status of Treaties, Chapter IV: Human Rights, 9. Convention Against Torture and OtherCruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=treaty&mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.214. CAT requires instead that the act be intentional (not that it is intended to inflict severe physical ormental harm) and does not require “prolonged” mental harm.  Convention Against Torture andOther Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 130, art. (1)(a).215. Comm. against Torture, Concluding observations on the third to fifth periodic reports of the United
States of America, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/3-5, at 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available athttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/234772.pdf.216. See, e.g., cases listed infra note 219.217. See, e.g.,Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002).218. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961); Ahmed v. Goldberg, 2001 WL 1842398 (N. Mar. I.2001) (interpreting CAT); see also Igartua de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005)(colloquy regarding proper role of courts with respect to treaty interpretation between Boudin, C.J.,for majority, and Howard, J., in dissent).219. A reservation that is contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty would not be valid and shouldnot be enforced by a court.  VCLT, supra note 25, art. 19.  This argument was made with respect tothe reservation preserving the use of the juvenile death penalty under the ICCPR, but U.S. courtsrefused to question the validity of the reservation. See Domingues v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 783, 785(Nev. 1998).
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it matter whether the interpretation was proposed by the Executive branch or the
Senate?  To what extent should U.S. courts take into account differing
interpretations by other treaty parties?
Both the VCLT220 and domestic U.S. law adopt the principle that courts should
begin treaty interpretation by considering the ordinary or plain meaning of the text
of the treaty in the context in which the words are used.221 However, both
international and domestic law allow resorting to other sources to aid in treaty
interpretation, recognizing that the words of the treaty reasonably may be
susceptible to multiple meanings.222 In U.S. law, aids to treaty interpretation
include the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction
adopted by the parties.223 The VCLT includes in its general rules of interpretation,
“(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding interpretation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.”224 The VCLT also permits as a supplementary
means of interpretation recourse to the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances surrounding its conclusion.225
There are thus many possible aids in treaty interpretation that are accepted both
domestically and internationally.  An interpreting court must therefore make
choices regarding which aids to rely upon and how much weight to give to each one.
It is noteworthy that neither the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence nor the VCLT
expressly mentions ratification debates by a domestic legislature as a permissible
aid to construction, suggesting that U.S. Senate interpretations of a treaty provision
not codified into a formally notified and accepted condition are entitled to little
weight.226
Historically, U.S. Supreme Court justices sometimes rely on materials produced
during the Senate advice and consent process, such as presidential transmittal
documents and hearing testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
220. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 31.221. See, e.g., Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesell-schaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 325(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).222. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 31-32; Eastern Airlines, 499 U.S. at 535.223. Eastern Airlines, 499 U.S. at 542-44.224. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 31(3); see alsoRESTATEMENT (THIRD)OFFOREIGNRELATIONSLAW § 325(2)(AM. LAW INST. 1987).225. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 32.226. It could be argued these ratification debates are part of the “practical construction” of the treaty;however, the phrase “practical construction” is probably better read as referring to post-ratificationpractice, not pre-ratification debates over the treaty’s meaning.
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when interpreting treaties to which the United States is a party.227 However, these
references are generally to statements by Executive Branch officials describing the
understandings reached during the negotiation process with foreign parties.  The
Justices have not referred to statements by one or more U.S. Senators regarding
their understanding of the treaty’s meaning.228
In United States v. Stuart, the Supreme Court’s majority opinion relied on the
absence of any discussion of a different meaning of a treaty provision in the Senate
record to support its interpretation of the words in a bilateral tax treaty with
Canada.229 Justice Scalia objected to the Court’s reference to the Senate record,
pointing out the dangers of doing so.230 In particular, he pointed out the illegitimacy
of relying on a unilateral U.S. position rather than the understanding of the treaty
parties as reflected in its text.231 Statements made by individual Senators may not
reflect the understanding of the Senate as a whole and certainly cannot be said to
reflect the views of the Executive Branch or of the other treaty partners.232
Justice Scalia’s position in his concurring opinion in Stuart is the better one and
is supported by legal opinion. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the U.S.
Department of Justice authored an opinion in 1987 on the “Relevance of Senate
Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation”.233 In that opinion, OLC opined, “the
most relevant extrinsic evidence of a treaty’s meaning are the exchanges between
the parties negotiating it, i.e., the President and the foreign power.”234 It further
opined that while the Senate’s deliberations during the ratification process should
not be ignored, “the ratification record is not the determinative source of evidence as
to the treaty’s meaning under domestic law.”235
This opinion has further support in § 326(2) of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations Law, which takes the position that: “[c]ourts in the United States have the
final authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying it
as law in the United States, but will give great weight to an interpretation made by
227. David J. Bederman,Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’LL. 529, 534-35 (2008). See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. 713-14 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); IndustrielleAerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 530-38 (1987).228. See Volkswagenwerk, 486 U.S. at 713-14; Industrielle Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 530-38; Medellin v.Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510 (2008).229. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366-68 (1989).230. Id. at 371, 373-74 (Scalia, J., concurring).231. Id. at 374.232. Of course, statements by individual Senators do not carry legal authority in the way that a formalcondition voted on favorably by the Senate and included in a resolution of ratification would.233. Relevance of Senate Ratification History to Treaty Interpretation, 11Op. O.L.C. 28 (1987).234. Id.235. Id.
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the Executive Branch.”236 This section of the Restatement does not refer to Senate
understandings of the meaning of a treaty.
All of the above suggests the Executive branch’s interpretation of a treaty is due
deference because of its role in the treaty’s negotiation.  Conversely, the Senate’s
interpretation of the treaty does not carry the same weight unless it is expressed by
way of a formal “understanding” or “declaration” that is accepted by the President
during the ratification process and incorporated into the instrument of ratification,
thus alerting the other treaty parties. It is only through a formally expressed,
written “understanding” or “declaration” that courts can be certain the proffered
interpretation reflects the view of the majority of the Senate.  And, if that condition
is accepted by the President, it may reflect a shared understanding of both political
branches.  If the Senate’s interpretation affects the United States’ legal obligations
vis-à-vis its treaty partners, it must also be communicated to and accepted by those
treaty partners to become effective.  In fact, the better practice is to notify all
conditions to all treaty parties to allow for independent assessment of the legal effect
and an opportunity to respond.
Because the U.S. Constitution charges the political branches with conducting
foreign relations,237 their opinions as to the nature of the treaty obligations
undertaken by the United States  are worthy of deference.  And, as expressed above,
the President’s view is due more deference than the Senate’s in light of his
constitutional role in making and implementing treaties.  Thus, if the Senate’s
interpretation appears patently wrong, perhaps based on a plain reading of the text
or in light of contrary interpretations by other treaty partners, there may be good
reason for the courts to adopt a different interpretation.  Not only would such a rule
respect the Supreme Court’s role in the U.S. Constitutional system, it would also
allow the Court to ensure the United States’ interpretation is in accord with other
foreign or international interpretations of that same treaty language, bringing
uniformity to international law, as well as ensuring the United States is not in
breach of its international obligations.
236. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also El AlIsrael Airlines Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (“Respect is ordinarily due to rea-sonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.”); Factorv. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933) (“the construction of a treaty by the political departmentof the government, while not conclusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless ofweight.”).237. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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C. Are treaty partners or international tribunals bound by conditions
added by the United States?
If the United States’ treaty partners have notice of a condition at the time the
United States joins the treaty, it would seem they have an opportunity to accept or
object to that condition and decide whether to be in a treaty relationship with the
United States.238 In this regard, the ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to
Treaties contains provisions regarding the acceptance of or objections to declarations
similar to treaty reservation practices under Article 20 of the VCLT.  If the States
belonging to the treaty fail to object to a condition in a timely manner, they should
not be able to object to that condition at a later date.  This position would be
consistent with Article 20 of the VCLT with respect to reservations.239
One problem, however, is that some declarations and understandings are never
notified to the United States’ treaty partners.  This non-disclosure is premised on
the theory that it is not necessary because these conditions only affect the domestic
implementation of the treaty.  However, if those conditions affect the United States’
legal obligations arising from the treaty in a way that is objectionable to its treaty
partners, it seems reasonable that the treaty partners would not be bound by those
conditions if not given previous notice and opportunity to object.240 If the United
States (or any treaty party) wishes to rely on a treaty condition, it should be required
to notify that condition to all States party to the treaty.  In that way, each State has
an opportunity to assess the potential legal effect of the condition and respond
thereto.
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations
The data utilized for this article demonstrates that the United States Senate
regularly attaches a variety of conditions to U.S. participation in multilateral
treaties. The Senate’s use of conditions has risen dramatically over time, from 11-
12% in the 1960s and 1970s, to 34% in the 2000s. The data also demonstrates that
there are fairly significant differences in the use of conditions depending on the issue
area or type of treaty, with treaties relating to judicial and legal matters, cultural
matters, non-nuclear weapons, criminal behavior and human rights issues
attracting some of the highest numbers of conditions.   Furthermore, the data shows
U.S. treaty practice with respect to the use of conditions is not entirely consistent
238. See Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, supra note 43, at §§ 2.9.1, 2.9.2.239. VCLT, supra note 25, art. 20.240. See Coplin v. U.S., 6 Cl. Ct. 115, 139-40 (1984); see also discussion of New York Indians, supra pp.403-405.
Conditions in U.S. Treaty Practice: New Data and Insights on a Growing Phenomenon
411
with international practice, especially the United States’ use of understandings.
The use of conditions in current U.S. treaty practice creates many legal
uncertainties.  As a result, treaty partners may be unsure what international legal
obligations the United States has undertaken.  Likewise, persons in the United
States relying on U.S. treaty commitments may be unclear about their rights and
obligations under certain treaty provisions.  Accordingly, this article suggests
reforms in the use of conditions in treaty practice.  More specifically, the U.S. Senate
should no longer use conditions other than reservations and declarations.  Both
reservations and declarations are better understood in international treaty practice
than understandings or other types of conditions.  Additionally, the international
legal community should bring more clarity to the meaning and legal effect of
“declarations” attached to treaties by adopting mutually agreed upon definitions and
States should conform their practice to the newly agreed upon rules.  And, like
reservations, all declarations should be notified to treaty partners to allow them to
decide whether the declaration actually alters the bargain struck under the treaty.
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Annex B
Treaties that Prohibit Reservations
Subject matter category of treaty Number of treaties
Aviation 4
Communications 1







Judicial and Legal 3
Marine and Maritime Matters 10
Non-nuclear weapons 1
Nuclear 1
Trade and Commerce 15
Transnational Crime 2
Transportation 1
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Totals 21 80 35
